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Abstract
Security has become one of the major concerns in the Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS).
The Trusted Truck(R) System, provides an e¢ cient wireless communication mechanism for safe
exchange of messages between the moving vehicles (trucks) and the roadside inspection stations.
The vehicles and the station are equipped with processing units but with di¤erent computational
capabilities. To make this Trusted Truck(R) system more secure, this thesis proposes a secured
data protocol which ensures data integrity, message authentication and non-repudiation. The
uniqueness of the protocol is: it is cost-e¤ective, resource-e¢ cient and embeds itself into the
Trusted Truck(R) environment without demanding any additional infrastructure. The protocol
also balances the computational load between the vehicle and station by incorporating an
innovative key transport mechanism. Digital signatures and encryption techniques are used
for authentication and data condentiality. Cryptography algorithms along with optimization
methods are used for the digital signatures. The computational time for the algorithms are
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The US Department of Transportation (US DOT) conducts nearly 700 thousand inspections per
year on commercial vehicles.[?] With the increasing population and tra¢ c, this number keeps
on increasing. It is the US Department of Transportations responsibility to ensure that the
carriers are complying with the safety regulations without a¤ecting the time and protability
of the carriers. The Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) utilizes modern technologies and
systems to improve the current transportations systems of all kinds in the US. The Trusted
Truck(R) project is one such project which helped the US DOT in speeding up the carrier
verication by providing a wireless communication link to verify the credentials of the vehicle
that adheres to ITS standards. The Trusted Truck(R) Program was initiated in 2003 as a joint
e¤ort by Volvo Group North America, National Transportation Research Centre, Inc.,(NTRCI),
and The University of Tennessee. The main vision behind the Trusted Truck(R) is to provide
safe and e¢ cient truck transportation. Presenting and verifying the credentials happen even
before the truck approaches the inspection o¢ ce. Thus a lot of time is saved for the truck as
well as the inspectors who can then concentrate more on the safety violations. The concept
behind the Trusted Truck(R) system is that once a truck is veried and conrmed as trusted,
it can bypass other weigh stations. Along with the safe transportation, it is also capable of
providing secured communication via the wireless communication link.
Information security forms an important aspect of secured wireless communication between
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vehicle and road side inspection stations. Regardless of who is involved, all parties in the trans-
action must have condence that certain information security objectives have been met. Some
of the information security objectives are: data condentiality, authentication, authorization,
revocation, non-repudiation, etc. For decades, cryptography is in use for information security or
secured communication. Cryptography is a widely used tool in communications, computer net-
works and computer security. Modern cryptography can be divided into two classes: symmetric
key cryptography and public key cryptography. The former uses the same key for encryption
and decryption whereas the later uses two di¤erent keys: one public and the other private. RSA
is a public key cryptography which has been proved successful in secured message transfers.
RSA uses a pair of keys for encryption and decryption and also for digital signatures. Digital
signatures are used to verify the authenticity of a particular sender. In most of the secured
communications, RSA is used for digitally signing and transferring the secret key which is used
to encrypt the message. After successful verication of the authenticity of the sender, the secret
key is extracted and the message is decrypted.
1.2 Motivation
Cryptography has been proven successful for ages for data condentiality and authentication
in many security applications. Along with the advancements in cryptography algorithms, its
areas of application also increased. In the beginning military applications used methods of
encryption for exchanging condential data. Now-a-days many other applications and sectors
like banking, e-mail services, social networking, and even transportation systems greatly rely
on cryptography algorithms to maintain security standards. Intelligent Transportation Systems
(ITS) have been widely accepted as an advanced technology for providing e¢ cient transporta-
tion using intelligent systems. Security is an important aspect of ITS standards. Security in
transportation lies in the level of data condentiality and safe exchange of messages between
the systems. Data security using cryptography can be done in: Symmetric Key Cryptography
and Asymmetric Key Cryptography. Symmetric key is e¢ cient but not strong and asymmetric
key is easy to use but demands long keys. The cryptography algorithms are discussed in detail
in the next chapters.
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Trusted Truck(R) System has been successful in demonstrating an e¢ cient system which
provides a safe wireless communication link between the vehicles ( heavy vehicles like trucks) and
road side inspection stations. The vehicles and the stations exchange the required credentials
through this link which saves the e¤ort and time of the inspection stations. The advancements
in truck sensor technologies also helps the vehicles exchange the information related to the
physical condition of the vehicle. For the Trusted Truck(R) system to be secure, there should
be a data security infrastructure so that the messages are exchanged only between the trusted
parties. The necessity for a robust data security infrastructure for such a system initiated the
development of a resource-e¢ cient secured data protocol for the exchange of messages between
the vehicle (truck) and the inspection station. Asymmetric cryptography along with digital
signatures can be used to protect the integrity of the data, its originator or sender, and to
achieve non-repudiation. In an environment where critical information is exchanged between
the vehicles and the stations, there is always a threat of data manipulation, tampering of vehicle
sensors, and also identication of the participant. Using an asymmetric encryption algorithm
and a safe key transport channel, the security standards can be achieved [20].
This thesis presents a cost-e¤ective and resource-e¢ cient secured data protocol which per-
fectly ts in the Trusted Truck(R) System to provide data condentiality and message authen-
tication. The thesis also introduces an innovative way to use and enhance the speed of the
existing asymmetric key cryptography algorithm to balance the computational load between
the vehicle and the road side inspection station. The designed protocol uses RSA for the digital
signatures and DES for encryption and decryption. The DES key is transported safely through
a key-transport mechanism using RSA. The mathematical explanation of the algorithms are
explored in this thesis and required speed up is achieved intelligently.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 gives a brief review of concepts of public key cryptography and digital signatures It
deals with two algorithms in particular, which are required for the understanding of this thesis.
It also examines the modular arithmetic which is used at each and every stage of this protocol
design.
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Chapter 3 introduces the new designed communication mechanism and how it provides the
required security for the exchange of messages. It also describes the existing communication
system and how the new mechanism ts into the earlier system. Considering the available
resources, a step-by-step procedure for the design of new mechanism is discussed. Technical
details of the protocol are explained along with the duties of each and every participant in the
communication system.
Chapter 4 explains in detail the design of the protocol from a mathematical perspective.
The protocol is developed in ANSI C, compatible with all the systems in the Trusted Truck(R)
Environment. Various modular arithmetic operations and algorithms are discussed related to
the design of the protocol. It also discusses the major challenges faced during the design phase of
the system and how they are solved. Speed-up algorithms are used to reduce the computation
time for the public key cryptography systems and also to reduce the computational load on
the participants. This chapter also examines how minor changes to the execution of modular
exponentiation save time and e¤ort which is essential for the successful operation of the protocol.
Finally, chapter 5 concludes the thesis by providing some scope for the future work with




2.1 Cryptography Algorithms Explored
In this thesis, two famous cryptographic algorithm are used: RSA, a digital signature scheme
with message recovery option, and Data Encryption Standard (DES), a standard approved
by NIST [7] for encryption and decryption. Generally, when a message has to be exchanged
between two parties, RSA is used to safely transmit the DES key and further DES is used to
send or receive encrypted data.
2.1.1 Digital Signatures - RSA
Digital Signature, introduced by Di¢ e and Hellman in 1976 [8][9] is a scheme used in authen-
ticating a particular sender so that the recipient is assured that the message is sent from a
known sender and is not altered in between. Any digital signature scheme will have two stages:
signature generation and a corresponding verication algorithm. Public-key cryptography al-
gorithms can be used for digital signatures. RSA is one such public-key algorithm where either
the public or private can be used for encryption. Another cryptography algorithm used for
digital signature is the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) which cannot be used for encryption
[1][10].
RSA, named after its creators Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [11][12], is the rst known
public-key algorithm used for signing as well as encryption. The security of RSA lies in the
di¢ culty of factoring the large numbers. The public and private keys are a function of a pair
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of large prime numbers. Recovering the plaintext from the cipher text is considered equivalent
to factoring the product of these prime numbers. Two random large prime numbers p and q
are selected. For maximum security p and q are chosen to be of equal length. The product of
p and q is computed:
n = pq (2.1)
The encryption key e is chosen such that e and (p 1)(q 1) are relatively prime. The decryption
key is computed using the Euclidean algorithm such that,
ed  1(mod(p  1)(q   1)) (2.2)
Now d and n are also relatively prime. The numbers e and n form the public key pair; the
number d is the private key. The message m is broken down into blocks mi smaller than n: The








The message can also be encrypted with d and decrypted with e In this thesis we used d
for encryption and e for decryption. RSA is usually slower than symmetric algorithms but
speed up can be obtained in various ways. One such way is choosing the value of e. As
we see the equation (2.3) is a modular exponentiation, the value of e decides the number of
multiplications in the equation. The three most common values of e are 3; 17; and 65537: The
Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail Standard (PEM) and the Public-Key Cryptography Standard
(PKCS) recommend 3 and 65537 [13][14]. In [1], it is explained that when the messages are not
identical, a smaller value of e (equal to 3) will not allow any Low Exponent Attacks [2]. And
also with a larger value of d and a small value of e, the attack mentioned by Micheal Wiener
in [15] cannot occur. It has also been proved in many papers that even recovering a few bits
of information from the RSA encrypted cipher text is as hard as factoring n. We used 64 byte
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prime numbers to generate the public and private keys in this thesis, so all the RSA encrypted
messages are believed to be very secure as factoring a 128 byte number is very di¢ cult. Private
key operations can be speeded up by using Chinese Remainder Theorem which needs calculation
of some additional values other than n and d [16].
2.1.2 Encryption and Decryption - DES
DES, one of the most frequently used cryptographic algorithms, was released in 1977 by the
National Bureau of Standards (NBS) , now The National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST). DES is a block cipher which means it breaks the message (or plaintext) into blocks
of 64 bits and encrypts each block separately. The mechanism for doing this is called Feistel
System, after Horst Feistel [1].
In DES, a block of cipher consists of 64 bits. The key has 56 bits expressed as 64 bits. Every
8th bit is a parity bit and is used for error detection purpose, leaving 56 bits for the actual key.
The output of the encryption is a 64-bit cipher text. Encryption is carried out in 16 stages.
From the input key (say K), sixteen 48-bit subkeys Ki are generated, one for each stage. The
64-bit plaintext is divided into 32-bit halves L0 and R0: Each round is functionally equivalent
to taking 32-bit inputs Li 1 and Ri 1 from the previous stage and producing Li and Ri for all
i from 1 to 16 as,
Li = Ri 1 (2.5)
Ri = Li 1  f(Ri 1;Ki) (2.6)
where f(Ri 1;Ki) = P (S(E(Ri 1)Ki));
P is a xed permutation on 32 bits;
E is a xed expansion permutation mapping Ri 1 from 32 to 48 bits;
S is the 6 to 4 bit substitution mapping box,
Ki is a string of 48 bits obtained from the key K:
Figure 2-1 show the detailed process of a DES algorithm. Initially, the message m is per-
muted by a xed permutation (IP). Then the left and right halves are exchanged and nally the
inverse of the initial permutation is applied to get the cipher text c. Decryption is performed
in the same way but the keys K1;K2; ::::;K16 are used in the reverse order. The function
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Figure 2-1: Data Encryption Standard Computation Path
8
Figure 2-2: DES function
f(Ri 1;Ki) is shown in gure 2-2. The Initial Permutation is done according to the table in [6].
The expansion permutation and the substitution mapping boxes (S-boxes) are shown in detail
in [6]. Each bit of the key is used in approximately 14 out of 16 rounds. The permutation tables
are designed in such a way that each bit of the cipher text should be dependent on all the bits
of plaintext. But practically this happens only in few rounds. The S-boxes are considered to
be the heart of the algorithm and they are the key factors for security [2]. So many constraints
have been laid down in constructing the S-boxes [17]. Block ciphers can also be executed in
many di¤erent modes as in the real world the message would be either larger than block size
or smaller than block size. Many modes have been designed for the block ciphers: Electronic
Codebook Mode (ECB), Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feed-
back (OFB), and Counter Mode (CTR). Detailed explanation for each and every mode can be
found in [2]. In this thesis, we used the ECB mode for the encryption and decryption.
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2.2 Modular Arithmetic Revisited
Modular Arithmetic is one of the widely used concepts of number theory in the areas of cryp-
tography. In cryptography, modular arithmetic is often used in symmetric key algorithms like
AES, IDEA [6], and public key systems like RSA. The theory of modular arithmetic is widely
dependent on congruence relations. Linear system of congruences can be solved in polynomial
time using modular arithmetic. In algorithms like RSA where operations like exponentiation on
large numbers are involved, modular arithmetic techniques help in computing exponentiation
modulus n e¢ ciently. In modular arithmetic, b mod a gives the remainder when b is divided by
a. Talking in terms of congruence, a and b are said to be congruent modulo n, when
a  b (mod n) n > 0 (2.7)
This says that a and b leave the same remainder when divided by n. Properties like transitivity,
reexivity, and symmetry apply to congruence relation [6]
2.2.1 Modular Addition and Subtraction
Modular addition or subtraction does not involve any long division. The numbers are initially
summed up and later on divided to get the remainder. Let n be any positive integer, a,b be
any non-negative integers, then,
(a+ b)modn = amodn+ bmodn = f
a+ b; if a+ b < n
a+ b  n; if a+ b  n
(2.8)
Addition and subtraction have a bit complexity of O(lg n).
2.2.2 Modular Multiplication and Division
Modular multiplication and division and complex in nature compared to addition (or subtrac-
tion). The computation becomes complex when larger numbers are involved. Let a (n + 1
bits) and b (t + 1 bits) be integers expressed in binary notation: a = fanan 1::::a1a0g and
b = fbtbt 1::::b1b0g. The product of a and b will have at most (n + t + 2) bits: Multiplication
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is done by the simple multiply-and-add method used in integer theory. The bit complexity of
multiplication is O((lg n)2).
Modular division is the most complicated and time consuming operation in modular arith-
metic. Division is done by using the shift-and-subtract method. The bit complexity of division
is again O((lg n)2): It is shown that the complexity of multiplication and division can be reduced
by using techniques like Montgomery Reduction [6]. Complete algorithms for multiplication and
division can be found in [1][6]
2.2.3 Modular Exponentiation
Modular Exponentiation is crucial for many cryptographic algorithms. In the later sections, it
can be observed that most of the cryptographic algorithms involve modular exponentiations at
various stages. The public key system RSA which is the key factor for this thesis uses expo-
nentiation for digital signatures as well as encryption. Let a; k;and n be non negative integers
represented in binary form, the modular exponentiation akmodn can be computed using the
repeated square-and-multiply algorithm [6]. In this algorithm exponentiation is computed by
performing a series of square and multiply operations. It is also called binary exponentiation
as it uses the binary expansion of the exponent k. Algorithm 2.1 gives a brief description of the
repeated square-and-multiply algorithm. Here, a; n are very large integers and k is an integer
exponent represented in binary form fk0k1::::kt 1ktg with k0 as MSB k can also considered
as a bit string of length t denoted as k[1::t]: In this thesis the value of t goes up to maximum
1024 bits. This representation of exponent k is a way to reduce the number of multiplications
in the exponentiation computation. Various representations have been proposed [18] to reduce
the multiplications.
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Algorithm 2.1: Repeated Square-and-Multiply Method for Modular Exponentia-
tion
INPUT: a; n, and k
OUTPUT: akmodn
1. Begin
2. Set b   1
3. IF k = 0 THEN return (b):
4. Set A   a:
5. IF k0 = 1 THEN set b   a:
6. FOR i from 1 to t do the following:
6.1. Set A   A2modn:




2.2.4 Chinese Remainder Theorem
The Chinese Remainder Theorem states that "Suppose gcd(m;n) = 1. Given integers a and b
, there exists exactly one solution x (modmn) to the simultaneous congruences x  a (modm);
x  b (modn)" [2]. Generally, if the prime factorization of n is p1  p2  p3:::  pt; then the
equations
(xmod p1) = a1




(xmod pt) = at
have a unique solution, x; where x < n. Thus consider n = p  q (as in RSA), then for any
arbitrary a and b, there exists an unique solution x < p  q; such that
x  a (mod p); and x  b (mod q) (2.9)
Then Euclids algorithm, u is calculated such that,
u  q  1 (mod p) (2.10)
12
then the solution x is computed as,
x = [f(a  b)  ugmod p]  q + b (2.11)
The Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) is used in the computation of the modular exponen-
tiation akmodn where n can be written in terms of prime factors p and q (p and q are two
large prime numbers). In RSA, the exponent k is also obtained from the prime numbers. So
it can also be written as a function of the prime numbers. One of the usual solutions to the
exponentiation is to compute small integers that are congruent modulo n to various powers of
k [19]. In equation (2.4), public key n and private key d are both obtained from the prime
numbers p and q: By calculating some additional values along with the keys, CRT can be ap-
plied to compute the equation making it much faster than traditional modular exponentiation
algorithm ( repeated square-and-multiply). Additional values required are dp = dmod(p  1);
dq = d(mod q   1); and q 1mod p: These values are calculated along with the private key d.
2.3 Trusted Truck(R) Environment
The Trusted Truck(R) Program was initiated in 2003 as a joint e¤ort by Volvo, NTRCI and The
University of Tennessee. The aim of the Trusted Truck(R) program is to develop a secure and
trusted transport solution from pickup to delivery. The programs objective is to increase safety,
security, and e¢ ciency of truck transportation by presenting wireless credentials to roadside
inspectors that conrm that the tractor, trailer and cargo meet all appropriate requirements
for safe transportation of the cargo. By presenting these credentials without the need for
the truck to stop, the number of inspections increase, the e¢ ciency of the system improves,
and inspectors can have more time to target more likely safety and security violations. More




This section describes the selection of cryptographic algorithms and the designed communica-
tion mechanism for the secured data exchange between moving vehicle and the weigh station.
3.1 Objective
The existing Trusted Truck(R) system provides a successful wireless communication link be-
tween the moving vehicle and the weigh station for credential verication. For the system to
be more secure, there is a need for the wireless link to be more robust in design as well as
in security related aspects. Thus, design of a secured data protocol has been proposed. The
main objective of this approach is to provide an e¢ cient, less-complex security protocol to be
used for the secured data communication among the moving vehicles in the Trusted Truck(R)
system. The fundamental step to achieve this objective is to select the appropriate algorithms
and use them e¢ ciently.
3.2 Requirements and Resources
For the system to be termed as secure, the application must be able to trust that the com-
munication has been received unaltered and from a known source. This requires the ability to
provide data condentiality and authentication. In this thesis we tried exploring the crypto-
graphic algorithms to provide authentication and condentiality in an e¢ cient and innovative
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way. The other requirement is the e¢ cient usage of resources and to minimize the computation
time.
In the Trusted Truck(R) system, the possible threats involving the data condentiality are
 Vehicle, truck and cargo identication
 Tampering or replacing of sensors
 Impersonation of attacks
The developed protocol should balance the asymmetry between the computational resources
at the vehicle (truck) and at the inspection stations (weigh station). Thus, in this thesis, apart
from merely applying the cryptographic algorithms, analysis has been done on the computa-
tional time for each algorithm and the most appropriate one is being used. Also, the computa-
tional load on the vehicle side is reduced when compared to that on the inspection station. The
vehicles and the inspection stations are not expected to have the state-ofthe-art equipment.
Additionally, the security protocol has to t in the existing Trusted Truck(R) infrastructure.
3.3 Algorithms
Cryptography has been in use for ages to maintain the condentiality of data and its authen-
tication in many systems which operate on highly secured data. After a considerable amount
of research, Public Key Cryptography has been selected as it proved to be more advantageous
and robust in key management when compared to symmetric-key cryptography where the same
key is used for the encryption and decryption[1]. In Public Key Cryptography (PKC), a pair
of keys, public and private, are used to encrypt and decrypt the message. The public key is so
constructed that the calculation of the private key is computationally infeasible from the public
key, and vice versa[1]. RSA is one such public key cryptosystem which o¤ers both encryption
and digital signature[2]. In RSA, anyone can send an encrypted message or verify a signed
message, but only someone in possession of the correct private key can decrypt or sign a mes-
sage. In the Trusted Truck(R) System, the vehicle and the inspection station should mutually
authenticate each other before the actual exchange of messages. Thus, the RSA algorithm is
used to serve the purpose of authentication in the form of digital signatures. And for encryption
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and decryption, another well known cryptographic algorithm called the DES[3] is used. The
DES is the basic building block for data protection. It uses a 56-bit key to transform a 64 bit
input into a 64 bit encrypted output[6]. Both the cryptographic algorithms selected involve
high ordered computations on the data.
3.4 Designed Communication Mechanism
3.4.1 Basic Communication Mechanism
The Trusted Truck(R) System involves three main entities Vehicle (truck), Station (departing
station, weigh station, arriving station) and the Certicate Authority. The departing station
is the point at which the vehicle starts from, the weigh station is the inspection station on
the highway and the arriving station is the destination location of the vehicle. In addition to
these we have the driver and cargo information which are crucial in the vehicle identication at
the departing station. The protocol is designed such that the identication and authentication
mechanisms are embedded in the messages that are transferred between the entities. The vehicle
is equipped with an On Board Unit (OBU) which is used for the software implementation on the
vehicle. Likewise the stations have a Road Side Unit (RSU). The Certicate Authority (CA) is
an entity which generates the digital certicates for use by the participants. The CA generates
the digital certicate that contains the public key and other identities of the vehicle/station.
The certicate generated by the CA is also like an attestation that the public key contained in
the certicate belongs to the vehicle/station. Here are the basic checks performed at di¤erent
levels while the vehicles originate from the departing point and reach the destination.
At the departing station,
 The driver and the cargo are veried. Along with this, the physical condition of the truck
is also noted. Sometimes the departing station may even have a biometrics application
which veries the driver by his/her ngerprint
 Once the credentials are veried, the station grants permission for the vehicle to leave the
departing station
At the weigh station,
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 The vehicle on approaching the weigh station exchanges the above collected data using
wireless communication link (GPRS)
 The weigh station veries the details and upon successful verication, allows the vehicle
to proceed further
At the arriving station(nal destination),
 Upon the arrival of the vehicle once again the credentials of the vehicle are veried and
the physical condition of the vehicle is checked
 If the verication process is successful, the cargo is received and message is transferred to
the vehicle indicating the reception of the cargo
The secured message transfer mechanism is designed such that it does not demand an
additional step other than the above mentioned checks, that is, it does not require a step in
between the vehicle and the station for the security related checks. This is done by embedding
the cryptographic algorithms within the messages that are exchanged between the vehicle and
the stations. As the initial step, the communication mechanism with the secured protocol
included is designed. The following sections will discuss this in detail.
3.4.2 Modied Communication Mechanism
Figure 3-1 shows the designed communication process or the message ow between the vehicle
and the station.
Before actually initiating the communication process, the Certicate Authority (CA) gen-
erates and approves all the public and private keys for the vehicle as well as the station. The
CA is considered as an entity which is credible by all parties wishing to communicate. The CA
generates the set of public and private keys for each and every vehicle separately and also for
the stations individually. It also generates the keys for itself. The CAs public and private keys
are used in the digital signatures.
Once the key generation is complete, each vehicle and each station are loaded with their
corresponding public and private keys. The CA also distributes its public key to all the vehicles
and the stations. The CA also digitally signs the vehicle/station IDs, expiration date and their
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Figure 3-1: Communication Process / Message Flow
public keys using CAs public key. Expiration date is used for verifying the validation of the
vehicle/station. ID represents the unique Identication Number given to the vehicle or the
station. Along with these keys, the vehicle collects and stores all the sensor readings,and cargo
details in the On Board Unit. With all the details ready, the truck initiates the communication
process with the station. The nature of the message exchanged depends on the type of station
(departing/weigh/arriving) it is communicating with. Here are the series of messages that are
exchanged between the vehicle and the station after initiating the communication process,
 The vehicle receives the stations certicate and using the preloaded CAs public key, it
veries the stations certicate. If all the credentials (ID, Expiration Date) are valid,
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the vehicle extracts the stations public key from the certicate. This assures the vehicle
that it is communicating with the correct station and not any intruder. After getting
the stations public key, the vehicle uses this public key to encrypt the unique Session
Keyand send the same to the station along with its certicate using the wireless link.
The Session Key is the key used to encrypt the vehicle details like the driver ID, cargo
details, sensor readings and other related information using the DES algorithm. This key
is unique and is generated each time the vehicle communicates with the station. Thus no
two stations will receive the same session key. If on the other hand, the stations details
fail to verify, the vehicle sends the invalid message and logs the result
 Upon receiving the vehicles certicate the station extracts the ID, the Expiration Date
of the vehicle, using the CAs public key. If the received details are valid, the station
proceeds to the next set of messages. The station extracts the session key from the
vehicles certicate using its private key and decrypts the vehicle details (ID, cargo details,
sensor readings and other related details) using the session key. If any of these details fail
to verify, the vehicle is not granted permission to proceed further and the result is logged
 The nature of messages depends on the station with which the vehicle is communicating
This modied communication mechanism as promised earlier, delivers all the required stages
which verify the identity of both the parties at each and every stage and at the same time main-
tains the condentiality of the data through encryption at every stage. Even if an intruder tries
to manipulate the messages, the original data behind the encrypted text cannot be extracted
under any means as the intruder will not have the key details of the vehicle/station. This mech-
anism does not demand additional hardware or software and uses the same basic communication
messages to establish the security.
The next step in the design of this protocol is to balance the computational burden on
the vehicle as well as the station. The vehicle takes more time to compute the cryptographic
algorithms when compared to the station, as it is generally equipped with lower end systems
when compared to the station. To overcome this, an innovative way of utilizing the travel time
has been formulated-O­ ine Key Transport Mechanism. The vehicle communicates with each
station in its journey from the source to the destination. When it communicates with a station,
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Figure 3-2: Key Transport Mechanism
it has to verify the certicate, encrypt the details and transmit them. The station on the other
side has to do the same but it decrypts the details. The vehicle uses the travel time between
any two stations e¢ ciently to perform all the computations necessary to communicate with the
next station.
3.4.3 O­ ine Key Transport Mechanism
In this method, the vehicle performs the operations in two modes: o­ ine and online. Here
o­ ine refers to the stage where the vehicle is not in the vicinity of the inspection station or
time before it reaches the inspection station and online refers to the time where the vehicle is
communicating with the station. The vehicle uses a method of o­ ine-key generation and an
online-key transportation to send the key to the station. Figure 3-2 explains in brief the process
of O­ ine Key Transport Mechanism.
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In O­ ine-Key Generation, the vehicle completes the generation of the session key and
generates a certicate by signing a message (containing the session key and the vehicle ID)
using the vehicles public and private keys. If K (8 Bytes) is the session key, then the message
V (128 Bytes) is framed as, V = f64 bytes of zeros jj 4 repetitions of V ehicleID jj 4 repetitions of
Kg: The message framing is further explained in the next chapter. When the vehicle approaches
the inspection station, after authenticating the station, the vehicle sends the session key and
its ID through Online-Key Transport Mechanism.
In Online-Key Transportation the station veries the vehicle and the vehicle signs the o­ ine
generated certicate (containing the session key) using the stations public key and sends this
signed certicate to the station. This certicate is transmitted to the station and upon veri-
cation, the station veries the data sent from the vehicle and takes the decision. As generation
of this certicate takes less time when compared to the o­ ine certicate and it also requires
stations verication, the vehicle makes this online.
In Session Key Recovery the station recovers the session key and decrypts the messages sent
by the vehicle by decrypting the signed certicate using the stations public key. The station
extracts the session key from the message V . This innovative way of using generating the key
o­ ine and performing the computations before approaching the station, reduces the load on
the vehicle as well as saves time for the inspection station.
Along with the key generation constraints, one more optimization is used to reduce the
computational time on the vehicle side: using the Chinese Remainder Theorem[5]. The Chinese
Remainder Theorem(CRT) as discussed in chapter 2, is one of the techniques used to speed
up the RSA calculations by using the divide-and-conquer rule[4]. So to reduce the time of
calculation on the vehicle side, the CRT technique is employed. As the stations operate on high
end systems and do not have a time constraint for the calculations, the station side systems
dont use the CRT technique for the cryptographic algorithms. By using CRT along with the
RSA algorithm, only the time taken for the calculations is reduced, without disturbing the
e¢ ciency of the original algorithm. And also this technique changes the way the mathematical
operations are executed but not the algorithm itself. Before calculating the computational
time in both the cases and discussing the challenges faced, various messages involved in this
communication system are discussed. The length of the messages and the discovery of an
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innovative way to utilize the resources and reduce the computational overhead is also explained
in the next section.
3.4.4 Message Formats
The entities in the Trusted Truck(R) system operate on data of di¤erent lengths starting from
the digital certicate to the vehicle related messages. The vehicles details like the driver ID,
vehicle ID, expiration date, cargo details, sensor readings and other vehicle related information
are 8 bytes in length. Likewise the stations ID, expiration date is again 8 bytes in length with
their most signicant bit equal to zero (MSB = 0). The length of the public and private keys
generated for the vehicle, station and the CA are,
 Public Key for vehicle/station 128 Bytes
 Private Key for vehicle/station 128 Bytes
 Public and private key for the CA 144 Bytes
The certicate length for any participant except the CA is dened to be the expiration date
(8 Bytes, MSB = 0), ID (8 Bytes, MSB = 0), public key (128 Bytes) and the CA signature of
the preceding three values. Thus, the certicate generated by the CA for the vehicle/station is
288 Bytes in length. The session key generated for each and every transaction is also 8 bytes
with the most signicant bit equal to zero(MSB = 0). The messages sent from the station like
granting permission for the vehicle, authorizing the vehicle to carry a specic cargo, destination
information, etc. are also 8 Bytes in length. Except for the certicates and keys used in the
cryptographic algorithms, all the messages exchanged between the vehicle and the stations are




In this chapter, we explore the mathematical explanation for the communication system dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. As the entire protocol use cryptographic algorithms for the data
security, we see that the necessary computations or the operations on the vehicle and the sta-
tion would be no more than modular exponentiations, multiplications and divisions. It involves
modular arithmetic operating on data less than or equal to 144Bytes. Here we discuss how the
computational load is balanced between the vehicle and the station which is the key factor for
this thesis. Various validations made at di¤erent levels on the data and on the intermediate
results are also discussed in this section. The major operations in this design are signature gen-
eration, signature verication, o­ ine-key transportation and encryption and decryption. Other
operations include extracting the details from the messages, exchanging messages, starting the
sessions, closing the sessions and logging the transaction. This section explains the mathemat-
ical operations involved in each step along with the computational load on each participant
(vehicle/station/CA). It also discusses an intelligent way of using the modular arithmetic prop-
erties in the cryptographic algorithms to balance the load between the participants so as to
make the protocol more time-e¢ cient, resource-e¢ cient and also cost-e¤ective.
The parameters used by the cryptographic algorithms are the public key, private key and
the message. Let ns and ds be the public and private key respectively for the station. Likewise
nt and dt represent the public and private key respectively for the vehicle. Here the subscript
sindicates station and trepresents the vehicle. Similarly nCA and dCA represent the public
and private key respectively for the Certicate Authority (CA).
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4.1 Signature Generation
For digitally signing the message, the RSA algorithm is used. Both the vehicle as well as the
station use RSA for mutual authentication. Let M be any message in the communication link
and S be any signed message. The contents of the message can be a single value or it can be
a concatenation of various values. The framing of the message also plays a key role in digital
signatures. All the keys except for the session key, are generated on the CA system. To generate
ns; nt; ds; dt; nCA and dCA the standard RSA algorithm is used as mentioned in chapter 2.
Recollecting the RSA algorithm, we know that the signed message S for a given message M is,
S =Mdmodn (4.1)
where d is the private key and n is the public key.
To generate these keys, large prime numbers p and q are generated as mentioned in chapter 2.
As we discussed earlier, the vehicle and station use 128 Byte keys whereas the CA uses 144 Byte
keys. So the prime numbers are each 64Byte for the vehicle (and station) and 72 Byte for the
CA. The procedure to generate the keys is kept the same except for their lengths. In view of the
computational loads on the entities, minor changes have been made while generating the keys
for the vehicle and station. As the CA works as a separate entity without any restrictions on the
computational load, no major changes have been made on the algorithms used on the CA side.
The need for this change is discussed in detail in the next sections. The large prime numbers p
and q are randomly generated such that (p 1)mod 3 6= 0 and (q 1)mod 3 6= 0. The primality
of the numbers is tested using the Fermat Primality Test[2]. The ps and qs for the station are
generated in a way that they are always greater that the values generated for the vehicle, that
is pt and qt. To ensure that this relational inequality is maintained, the second most signicant
bit of pt and qt is always made 0(zero) and that of ps and qs is always made 1 (one). So the
prime numbers for the vehicle take the form f10p2p3p4:::::::plen 21g and the prime numbers for
the station take the form f11p2p3p4:::::::plen 21g. As the numbers are prime in nature, the LSB
(Least Signicant Bit) and MSB (Most Signicant Bit) will always be 1 (one). Using the RSA
algorithm[6], the public keys are calculated as,ns = ps  qs;nt = pt  qt;nCA = pCA  qCA: And




2  (p  1)  (q   1) + 1
3
(4.2)
From observation, the MSB of d is always equal to 1 and for n both the MSB and LSB are
equal to 1. From a mathematical perspective, the signature generation equation represents a
modular exponentiation equation, where a valueM is exponentiated to d rst and is then divided
by n to get the remainder. An algorithm similar to the simple repeated square-and-multiply
algorithm[6] is used to compute the modular exponentiation. Equation (4.1) is computed as,
Algorithm 4.1: Modular Exponentiation (Using repeated square-and-multiply algorithm)
INPUT : M; dfd0d1::::::dlen 2dlen 1g; n; len(size of n or d in bits)
OUTPUT : S =Mdmodn
1. Begin
2. Choose S    1
3. FOR i from 0 to len  1 do the following
3.1 S    S2modn
3.2 IF di = 1 (di is the ith coe¢ cient of the binary representation of d)




In this application, the certicate authority (CA) generates the digital certicate for the
vehicle as well as the station using CAs set of keys, that is (nCA; dCA). The message M is
constructed from the participants details. Let Mt be the message for the vehicle and Ms be
the message for the station, the messages are constructed as,
Mt = fExpDtjjV ehicleIDjjntg (4.3)
Ms = fExpDtjjStationIDjjnsg (4.4)
where ExpDt is the expiration date for the participants ID
V ehicleID is the 8 Byte vehicles identication number
StationID is the 8 Byte stations identication number
ns is the 128 Byte stations public key
nt is the 128 Byte vehicles public key
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When the vehicle receives the stations certicate, it extracts the stations ID and checks
the expiration date. If it is valid, it proceeds to the further step in the communication. Similar
extraction and verication happens on the stations side.
4.2 Signature Verication
Digital signature verication process consists of a verication algorithm followed by recovering
the original message. When the vehicle and station mutually authenticate each other, they
exchange their digital certicates and once the original message or data is veried, further
communication is carried on. For every signature generation algorithm, there is a correspond-
ing signature verication algorithm. RSA provides verication along with digitally signing a
message. So the same RSA verication algorithm[6] is used to verify the signature generated
without message recovery. Here the extracted message is compared to the original message
to verify the certicate. Mathematically, verication is similar to generation in a sense that
verication also uses modular exponentiation. Let R be the message obtained after extraction
from the certicate and let the encryption constant as discussed in chapter 2 be equal to 3,
that is e = 3. To improve the e¢ ciency of the decryption, generally a smaller exponent value is
used, here e = 3: As the message is not the same for any two stations, smaller exponent will not
cause any kind of intruder to recover the original message. Also the message is almost of the
same length as n but less than n, so the attacks which target the small messages are also not
possible. The other advantage of having a smaller exponent is that it accelerates the encryption
process. If e = 3, the encryption process will consist of only 1 modular multiplication and 1
modular squaring. Thus R can be obtained as,
R = S3modn (4.7)
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where S is the digital signature for the message M , n is the public key of the entity which
generated the certicate. Algorithm 4.2 explains the calculation of M:
Once we extract R; it is compared withM to verify the certicate. Equation (4.7) is again a
modular exponentiation similar to equation (4.1) with a smaller exponent. The same repeated
square-and-multiply algorithm is used to compute equation (4.7) but with a single iteration as,
Algorithm 4.2: Signature Verication
INPUT: M; S; n
OUTPUT: R = S3modn
1. Begin
2. Choose B
3. Compute B    S  Smodn
4. Compute R   B  Smodn
5. IF R =M
THEN return veried
ELSE return failed to verify
6.End
4.3 Key Transport Mechanism
The vehicle uses preliminary o­ ine-key transportation mechanism to generate the session key
while approaching the station. As the session key is used for the encryption and decryption of
the critical messages, care has to be taken while transporting the session key to the station.
Instead of sending the message directly, a message V is framed with the session key in it such
that only that specic station is able to recover V and at the same time the station must be
assured that the specic vehicle sent that message V . As discussed earlier the 128 Byte message
V is framed as
V = f64 bytes of zeros jj V ehicleID jj V ehicleID jj V ehicleID jj V ehicleID jj
K jj K jj K jj Kg (4.8)
where K is the session key,
V ehicleID is the 8 Byte ID used to identify the vehicle.
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This message is digitally signed using the (nt; dt)
L = V dt modnt (4.9)
where L is the digital signature of the message V
nt; dt are the public and private keys of the vehicle respectively
Unlike the previous signature generation, where we generate the digital signature and trans-
mit to the other party, here we do not transmit the signature immediately after signing it for
the following reason. The session key should be kept secret and only the specic station should
be able to recover and use it to decrypt the vehicle details. So in order to maintain the con-
dentiality, both the parties agree upon the message format and the repetitions of the ID and
the session key in the original message. This prevents from any intruder from modifying the
message. The number of repetitions of the ID signies the known message which is embedded
in the original message. Unlike the standard RSA[6], here we cannot transmit the original mes-
sage for signature verication as we did in Algorithm 4.2 as it consists the secret key (session
key). So even the signature is encrypted and later on the key is recovered from the extracted
message. Let C be the encrypted version of the signed message, then C is given by,
C = L3modns (4.10)
where C is the encrypted message,
ns is the stations public key
that is,
C = fV dt modntg3modns (4.11)
It is important to mention that equation (4.10) is not be confused with the equation (4.7) as
the latter refers to the signature verication with the public key e = 3 and the former refers to
the encryption using RSA. Equation (4.10) can be stated otherwise as a message (L) obtained
after signing the original message with the (nt; dt) rst and later on signing with the stations
public key with the encryption exponent as 3. The station can recover the message from the
encrypted message by using the combination of previously discussed signature generation and
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signature verication algorithms as,
V = fCds modnsg3modnt nt < ns (4.12)
Equation (4.12) can be explained as decrypting or extracting the message rst using (ns; ds)
and later on extracting the original message V using (nt; 3) using algorithm 4.1. Here it is worth
mentioning the inequality, nt < ns again as extracting the original message using equation (4.12)
is infeasible if nt  ns. Now, as both the parties agree upon the format of the original message,
the station can easily recover the key by checking the last 64 bytes of the message (here V ). By
verifying the V ehicleID in the message, the station can assure that the message is from the
required vehicle and not any intruder. Once the station recovers the session key, it can decrypt
the vehicles details and exchange the messages with the vehicle.
As discussed in section 3.3, Data Encryption Standard (DES) is used to encrypt the data
exchanged between the vehicle and the station. DES as such does not involve highly complicated
computations when compared to RSA and other digital signature algorithms. The computations
involved in a DES algorithm are logical AND, logical XOR and logical OR which take time
that is insignicant when compared to modular exponentiations. The DES algorithm takes a
8 Byte value and generates a cipher text of 8 Byte using a 64 bit key. In this application, the
64bit key is generated from the session key which is created for each and every transaction with
the station. All the message exchanges except for the messages used for authentication are 8
Bytes in length.
4.4 Optimization using Chinese Remainder Theorem
The modular exponentiation has a higher order of complexity and also consumes more time
compared to other calculations. The Chinese Remainder Theorem optimizes the time taken for
the modular exponentiation, thus speeding up the RSA process. When data of large size if used
in the exponentiation, the CRT techniques breaks down the exponentiation into parts and then
combines them. Even though this looks complex, the nal result is obtained is lesser time. By
using the CRT, it reduces the time taken for the modular exponentiation by 4 times, that is,
time taken using CRT technique = 14 time taken without using the CRT technique.
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Consider equation (4.1), where n = p  q, d = 2(p 1)(q 1)+13 and n and d are both 128 Byte
numbers. Among the prime numbers p and q, usually p is the larger prime number and the




)mod(p  q) (4.13)
Since both p and q are 64 byte wide here, the exponent (d) as well as the divisor(n) will
be 128byte. This exponentiation can be broken down into two parts and then later on can be
combined to get the result S. All the certicates generated on the vehicle uses CRT acceleration
along with the other crypto routines. Here, the value of S is calculated without actually
calculating n: Algorithm 4.3 is based on to the traditional Chinese Remainder Theorem[6].
Algorithm 4.3: Signature Generation using Chinese Remainder Theorem
INPUT: M;p; q; d
OUTPUT: S =Mdmod(p  q)
1. Begin
2. Compute dp   dmod(p  1)
3. Compute dq    dmod(q   1)
4. Compute Mp  M mod p; Mq   M mod q
5. Consider a and compute a   (M mod p)dpmod p
6. Consider b and compute b   (M mod q)dqmod q
7. Consider U and compute U    qp 2mod p
And also verify if (U  q)mod p = 1
8. IF a < b THEN a   a+ p
9. Compute X    [f(a  b)  Ugmod p]  q + b
10. Return X
11. End
After calculating X using algorithm 4.3, we observe that both X and S are the same which
shows that using CRT in the computation of modular exponentiation, just reduces the number
of iterations but does not disturb the result. Comparing algorithm 4.3 with algorithm 4.1, one
can notice that the number iterations are greatly reduced, thus reducing the complexity of the
operation. And also, the number of multiplications and divisions computed in algorithm 4.1 are
far more compared to that of algorithm 4.3 where we used the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
The values a; b and U can be computed using the repeated square-and-multiply algorithm. As
the CRT operates on data which is exactly half of the length of the date which is used in
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the original modular exponentiation algorithm, it reduces the computation time by four times.
Thus, all the signature generation operations executed on the vehicle use signature generation
with CRT while all the operations executed at the station follow algorithm 4.1.
4.5 Computational Challenges - Solution
In this application, all the operations on the vehicle use a 16 bit processor while the stations
use a 32 bit processor. This creates the imbalance in the computational time for the vehicle
and the station. The following show the time taken for the similar operations on both 32 bit
as well as 16 bit without using Chinese Remainder Theorem,
time taken for modular exponentiation on a 32 bit processor without CRT is 0:2 0:3 sec :(approx:)
time taken for modular exponentiation on a 16 bit processor without CRT is 0:4 0:5 sec :(approx:)
This time di¤erence causes a great asymmetry in the communication process where the station
should be validating a number of vehicles in a given time. So in order to balance this inequality,
optimizations have been made in many ways on the vehicle side. The attempts to reduce the
computational load on the truck starts at the CA level by incorporating few constraints on
the keys generated for the truck. When the CA generates the public and private keys for the
truck, it ensures that those keys are always less than the keys generated for the station so that
the values calculated on the truck are always less than that at station and always take less
time. All the trucks perform the session key generation required for the authentication o­ ine
(16 bit processing). This o­ ine-key generation is done for every communication session before
approaching a station, thus saving the time. On the other hand, the stations perform all the
operations online (32 bit processing). As we observe the only operation performed by the truck
onlineis the modular exponentiation with the exponent equal to 3 i.e., A = B3modN where
A,B and N are 128 byte numbers. Mathematically as the operation A = B3modN just involves
one modulo calculation, it takes very less time when compared to the operation A = BE modN .
Thus when the truck starts communicating with the station, it does not have to spend much
time on calculation. Thus all these methods combine to reduce the computational load on the
vehicle and help the vehicle in nishing the computations in a less and reasonable time. After
implementing the CRT on the vehicle, the time taken for the modular exponentiations is greatly
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reduced,
time taken for the modular exponentiation on a 16 bit processor using CRT is 0:12 0:14 sec
(approx:)
It is noticed that this time, 0:12 seconds is nearly equal to 14
th
times the time taken without
using CRT, that is 0.4 seconds. which clearly proves that including Chinese Remainder The-
orem reduces the computation time by 4 times. And also the time taken for the o­ ine-key
generation which is here the time taken for modular exponentiation in 16 bit processor using
CRT (0:12 sec :) is very less than the time taken for the vehicle to travel from one station to
the other. So the vehicle can easily generate the o­ ine key and transfer the key online while
approaching the station.
4.6 Results and Discussion
4.6.1 Implementation
The security protocol is developed in basic ANSI C which is inexpensive and does not need
any additional software for compiling. The software developed is fully compatible with a Unix
platform. The OBUs and the RBUs are equipped with systems working on Unix platform. Three
di¤erent packages are developed individually for the Certicate Authority (CA), Vehicle (truck)
and the Station. All packages have their own code running independently on the respective
system. The CA package is responsible for the generation of keys, digital signature for the
vehicle and the station. The vehicle package (truck) is responsible for three major operations
- O­ ine Key generation, Signature Verify and Encryption. The station package is responsible
for the following operations-Signature Verication and Decryption. In all the communication
sessions, the vehicle is assumed to initiate the communication while it is entering the vicinity
of the station. Along with message transfer, each and every communication session is logged




The computational time is noted at each and every stage in the mathematical operations and
proper care is taken while selecting the appropriate cryptographic algorithms which will t
the available environment. The time taken for the modular exponentiations in both 32 bit
and 16 bit is observed and noted. Table 1 shows the time taken by a 32 bit processor for
the modular exponentiation operating both without using CRT and using CRT. The average
time taken by a 32 bit processor to compute the equation (4.1) that is S = Mdmodn is
0:218 seconds (approx:). The same 32 bit processor takes 0:05715 sec (approx:) to compute
X = [f(a b)Ugmod p]q+b in Algorithm 4.3. This supports the proof of Chinese Remainder
Theorem reducing the computational time by nearly 4 times.
Trial No Time taken without Time taken using CRT (secs)











Average = 0.2186 0.05715
But, in this application the participant which requires a speed up process is the vehicle
which uses a 16 bit processor. Thus time estimates are noted for a 16 bit processor also.
It is found that the average time taken by a 16 bit processor to compute the equation S =
Mdmodn is in the range of 0:4   0:5 sec(approx:), that is without incorporating CRT. When
CRT acceleration is applied the same 16 bit processor, the time taken is observed to be in the
range of 0:12   0:13 sec(approx:): This once again proved the e¢ ciency of Chinese Remainder
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Theorem in reducing the computational time. By observing these values, it can be concluded
that computational imbalance has been totally balanced and the vehicle is left with ample time
for any other computational duties other than message exchange. Looking at the station side,
which takes 0:4 sec to compute the crypto routines, it would be easy for any station to complete
the verication process within a very short time that too while the vehicle is approaching and
this helps the station concentrate on any other trivial details other than validating the vehicles.





This thesis explains how a secured data protocol for the Trusted Truck(R) system is developed
successfully. It explains the necessity of a secure data infrastructure in an e¢ cient wireless
communication system like Trusted Truck (R). By using RSA, a public key cryptography al-
gorithm and the Data Encryption Standard (DES) for encryption and decryption, a secured
communication mechanism has been designed. Speed up algorithms are used along with RSA to
improve the computation time on the vehicle which balances the computational e¤ort on both
the station and the vehicle. A secured key transport mechanism has been introduced along with
the enhancements in the computations. The time taken for the algorithms with and without
using the speed up algorithm is shown. The protocol is designed in a way that it embeds itself
in the existing architecture of the Trusted Truck(R) system without any additional hardware
or software. The protocol is developed in standard ANSI C and using the TCP / IP protocol
stack and is platform independent.
5.2 Future Work
Further advancements to the protocol can be made by optimizing the algorithms used in the
design. Optimizing the algorithms further reduces the time taken by the vehicle or the station
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